Theories of a Brown Monkey

12th February 2012

Link reblogged from MLQ3 on Tumblr! with 4 notes

The debate in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on whether impeachment should be vested in the Supreme Court or not →

mlq3:

July 28, 1986 R.C.C. 41

MS. AQUINO: I appreciate the explanation of the Committee Chairman. But for purposes of conceptual clarity, we might as well underscore the fact that impeachment, although it is an exercise of a political act, is essentially a judicial function. The political component here would be necessary in recognizing that an impeachment procedure, which is a judicial function, covers not only political matters but even legal matters.

MR. MONSOD: We realize that there is a judicial function involved in the impeachment process. But I think the questions we want to address ourselves are: Is the provision on impeachment still necessary? Does it serve a useful purpose as far as the political processes are concerned?

MS. AQUINO: I may be launching a lonely crusade here. Even as I would concede that the powers of impeachment might have to be vested in the legislature, I would conduct a massive overhaul of the procedures to make impeachment procedure a viable option.

MR. MONSOD: We would be very happy to take a look at any suggestion that would improve our Constitution.

MS. AQUINO: Do I take it to mean that I am effectively foreclosed in terms of a conceptual redefinition of impeachment procedures when I would attempt to vest it in the judicial courts insofar as the presidency is concerned?

MR. MONSOD: Yes. Mr. Presiding Officer, I believe the Committee at this point believes that an overhaul in that direction might not be appropriate. But we would be amenable to other suggestions in order to make it a more effective deterrent.

MS. AQUINO: My only concern is that experience has shown that impeachment procedures as they are now stated in the draft would be nothing more — pardon the Freudian slip but there is no better term for this — than a glorified act of political masturbation. There should be a conscious and deliberate attempt to make this a feasible and viable option in the exercise of a concern to protect the State against erring officers for malfeasance or misfeasance.

MR. MONSOD: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. We understand the Commissioner’s appreciation of the problem. What we are saying is that perhaps our perception of its deterrent effect even in cases where it seems to have failed may be different.

MR. NOLLEDO: May I propound an inquiry to Commissioner Aquino?

MS. AQUINO: Yes, gladly.

MR. NOLLEDO: The Commissioner need not overhaul the procedure. But it seems to me that she is suggesting some sort of judicial review; am I right?

MS. AQUINO: No, what I am suggesting is to transfer the impeachment power after the impeachment articles have been initiated and formulated by the joint action of the legislative chambers to the judicial courts.

MR. NOLLEDO: Thank you.

MR. OPLE:  Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): Commissioner Ople is recognized.

MR. OPLE: Will Commissioner Aquino yield to a question, too?

MS. AQUINO: Gladly.

MR. OPLE:  Commissioner Aquino must be aware that the main provision on impeachment in the draft article under discussion was lifted virtually from the two previous Constitutions, actually almost a verbatim copy of Article VII of the United States Constitution that was framed and ratified in 1787. May I briefly read Article VII:

Judgment in case of impeachment shall not extend further than the removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit under the United States, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law.

It is almost unchanged since the American constitutional framers established this impeachment rule in the Constitution of 1787.

But the reason I brought this up was to induce Commissioner Aquino to recall a more recent event related to impeachment in the United States Congress of an American President, Richard Nixon, who was facing impeachment. As a matter of fact, the charges had already been formulated in a committee of the House of Representatives and he was to be tried by the Senate in the full glare of world television. Instead of submitting to impeachment proceedings, he resigned, and later on was granted amnesty by President Ford. The point is that impeachment is a sword in the scabbard. It is as good as a sword drawn; it certainly caused the resignation of an American President because, in the words of President Ford before he gave the amnesty to President Nixon, the presidency of the United States probably could not withstand the rigor and injury arising from a public trial in the Senate by impeachment of the President of the United States.

Since this section is indubitably of American origin, I think we are justified in recalling some American-examples in the contemporary period. I do not want to share Commissioner Aquino’s despair that this impeachment or trial by the Senate, through the origination of charges in the House of Representatives is equivalent to a constitutional decoration or tinsel. It is actually a powerful check on the presidency. It may be a sword in the scabbard but there are circumstances when a sword in the scabbard is as good as a sword drawn.

Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MS. AQUINO: Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): What is the pleasure of Commissioner Aquino?

MS. AQUINO: I appreciate Commissioner Ople’s setting the stimulus of the discussion on this line. But there may be a variance of conceptual appreciation here.

Impeachment is not intended to punish the offender. Impeachment is a method of national inquest to protect the State. It does not intend to prosecute; it is not intended for its retributory or restitutory effects. Rather, it is in the nature of an exemplary act by which the State infuses the highest sense of responsibility to public service.

In other words, when the Constitution provides that the intent of an impeachment proceeding is not only to remove from office, it follows as a necessary concurrent effect the disqualification of that erring public officer from positions of trust or responsibility. It may be true that it is a sword in the scabbard but the sword in the scabbard can rust unless it is drawn.

MR. GUINGONA: Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): The Chair would like to understand the present parliamentary situation. Is Commissioner Aquino proposing a specific amendment?  

MS. AQUINO: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): On what section and what is the nature of the amendment?

MS. AQUINO: It will overhaul massively Section 3 in the sense that I am contemplating the possibility of amending Section 3 to vest in the judicial courts the power of impeachment trials after the impeachment articles have been formulated and initiated by the joint action of the legislative chambers. But the Committee has expressed reluctance to this position.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): Precisely, the Chair would like to know the reaction of the Committee on the proposed amendment.

MR. MONSOD: Mr. Presiding Officer, the Committee explained its position that we believe the present provision serves a very useful purpose, and we want to see it retained. Furthermore, if I get the drift of the arguments of Commissioner Aquino, the overhaul would involve the introduction of the judicial branch of the government into the process in the case of the President.

Our position is that the President has been directly elected by the people. Since this is a political act, the more appropriate judge of the President in this matter should probably be the direct representatives of the people as well, which are the Senate and the House.

MS. AQUINO: Mr. Presiding Officer, I am presently inclined to respect the position of the Committee. However, without foreclosing the possibility of introducing pertinent amendments on the basis of their position, may I make two inquiries?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): The Commissioner may proceed.

MS. AQUINO: Am I in agreement with the Committee that impeachment proceedings are essentially judicial in nature?

MR. ROMULO: No, we believe that they are political. Judicial aspects may come in the procedures such as the forming of the articles, the actual trial being presided over by the Chief Justice, and so on. But we still believe that they are essentially a political act rather than a judicial act.

MS. AQUINO: Precisely, I was very careful on my formulation of terms when I said impeachment proceedings, not impeachment power. So, we are agreed on the premise that impeachment proceedings are essentially judicial in nature. Does it follow, therefore, that when the legislative chamber sits to undertake impeachment proceedings, it sits not as a legislative body but as a judicial body; rather, it sits as a court of justice?

MR. ROMULO: In a way, they probably sit more like jurists, as finders of fact and the law, I suppose. They combine those functions. We could say that there is an exercise of judicial power involved.

MS. AQUINO: On the basis of these shared premises, would the legislature then, sitting to undertake impeachment proceedings, still be bound by the rules of legislative sessions? Specifically, if the legislature adjourns, are the Members duty-bound to terminate or preterminate — as the case may be — the impeachment proceedings if the supervening circumstance of adjournment of the sessions come in?

MR. ROMULO: I think that would depend on the rules they would adopt. Certainly, the Constitution does not settle that.

MS. AQUINO: Because I would proceed from settled jurisprudence that impeachment proceedings are essentially judicial in nature, such that it follows that when the legislative chamber undertakes these proceedings it sits as a court of justice and, therefore. it is not bound by the rules of legislative sessions. It cannot adjourn. Assuming that the session is adjourned, impeachment proceedings should not, in any way, be affected by the adjournment of the session. 

MR. ROMULO: That is not precluded from our proposal. If the Commissioner wants to make it explicit and to suggest amendments to that effect, I suppose we would not object. Our thinking is that if the Commissioner’s premise is that it is like a court of justice. maybe an adjournment of the hearing will certainly not preclude it from continuing the proceedings on some other day. In other words, it could not lose jurisdiction just because of adjournment.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): The Chair, therefore, understands from Commissioner Aquino that her proposed massive amendment is considered withdrawn.

MS. AQUINO: Not yet, Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): The Commissioner may proceed.

MS. AQUINO: On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for example, and the President resigns before judgment of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?

MR. ROMULO: If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation would render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the ordinary courts.

MS. AQUINO: I am not so much concerned about the civil and criminal aspects as I am concerned with the necessary effect of a judgment of conviction in an impeachment proceeding. A judgment of conviction also means disqualification from office; it does not only mean removal from office.

MR. ROMULO: Yes, I see that point. It is my personal opinion that if he resigns, that in itself would end the impeachment proceeding.

MR. RAMA: Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): The Chair recognizes the Floor Leader.

MR. RAMA: There are several other Commissioners who would like to amend the Article. May I ask that Commissioner Regalado be recognized?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): Just a minute. May we consider Commissioner Aquino’s proposed amendment withdrawn? 

MS. AQUINO: No, Mr. Presiding Officer. I have to consult Commissioner Guingona about it.

MR. GUINGONA: Precisely, Mr. Presiding Officer, I was going to ask Commissioner Aquino a couple of questions, if I may, in connection with her proposal.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas): Commissioner Guingona is recognized.

MR. GUINGONA: Is the Commissioner’s perception of an impeachment proceeding an exclusively political device or proceeding or an essentially political proceeding? If it is an essentially political proceeding, then there would be no objection to exceptions where courts may be allowed to be given the power to adjudicate on this particular proceeding. On the other hand, if it is exclusive because the President is elected by the people, the judgment about the President’s tenure or term of office should be judged by the representatives of the people, if the courts are not empowered to decide cases or questions relating to elections, and terms and qualifications of the President.

MS. AQUINO: Mr. Presiding Officer. may I briefly reply? It is my humble submission that an impeachment proceeding and an impeachment power are essentially political acts. But because of the nature of the judgment of conviction in an impeachment proceeding, it requires the process of adjudication. If we divorce ourselves from the conceptual definition of impeachment and focus on the practicality of impeachment proceedings, then it becomes necessary for us to reassess the procedure. I am not so much concerned in the conceptual purity of impeachment as I am concerned in it being a feasible and viable alternative in the exercise of protection of the State.

Tagged: impeachmentconstitutional commissioncorona

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